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This paper describes how a locally developed school ranking system 
affected student enrolment patterns in British Columbia over time. 
In developing an annual school ‘report card’ that was published in 
newspapers and online, the Vancouver-based Fraser Institute created 
a marketplace for school choice by devising an accountability scheme 
that highlighted and concealed visibility asymmetries between schools. 
Against the backdrop of a shifting political landscape, report cards 
helped focus the public’s attention on school achievement scores that 
identified low-, mid-, and high-performing schools. A quasi-market for 
education emerged in the non-place of language and discourse when 
school ranking results became the basis by which parents made decisions 
about where to send their children to school. When student achievement 
data is used to identify British Columbia’s ‘best’ and ‘worst’ performing 
secondary schools in this way, standardized assessment practices may be 
considered high-stakes.
Keywords: school rankings, discourse, accountability, Foucault, 
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THE EPISTEMOLOgY Of SEEINg
The emergence of school rankings and their impact on shaping educational discourse 
spans	at	least	three	continents—North	America,	Europe,	and	Australia—and	has	been	
ongoing	for	at	least	three	decades	(Cowley	&	Easton,	2006;	dwyer,	2006;	Goldstein	
&	Spiegelhalter,	1996;	rowe,	2000;	Tight,	2000;	West	&	Pennell,	2000).	despite	the	
geographic	 expanse	 over	which	 ranking	 debates	 occur,	 they	 have	 at	 their	 core	 the	
expression of common concerns about the impact school rankings have on teacher 
22
Accountability synopticism
morale, teacher effectiveness, selective admission procedures, and the erosion of 
professionalism in an educational system that values standardized testing and market 
driven	reforms	(Ball,	1997;	Gaskell	&	Vogel,	2000;	Lucey	&	reay,	2002;	Masleck,	
2000;	rist,	2000;	Shaker,	2007;	Webb,	2005,	2006,	2007).	Fewer	studies	have	looked	
at	how	school	rankings	operate	discursively	to	exert	disciplinary	power.
in	devising	a	school	ranking	rubric	that	established	which	key	performance	indicators	
(KPis)	 were	 relevant	 and	which	 ones	 were	 not,	 the	 Fraser	 institute	 in	Vancouver,	
British Columbia devised a statistical régime of truth that exerted a particular kind of 
disciplinary	power	that	changed	how	schools	were	perceived	by	the	public.	it	did	so	by	
developing	an	annual	school	‘report	card’	that	highlighted	and	concealed	differences	
between	schools.	once	published	by	the	media,	the	‘report	card’	operated	as	a	kind	of	
organizing text that used surveillance as its primary technique to manufacture a quasi-
market for school choice.
From	 the	 time	 secondary	 school	 ranking	 reports	 were	 first	 published	 in	 1998,	 the	
public	could	‘see’	how	groups	of	students	within	schools	performed	on	compulsory,	
standardized, government examinations. Published school rankings, therefore, 
provided	parents	with	an	 instrument	 that	distinguished	high-ranking	‘good’ schools 
from	low-ranking	‘bad’	ones.	over	time,	this	manufactured	distinction	influenced	the	
choices	parents	made	about	where	to	send	their	children	to	school.	When	surveillance	
is	used	to	shape	how	the	public	perceives	and	judges	schools	in	this	way	then	power	
extends beyond state-imposed limits. It also makes the standardized assessment 
practices	(from	which	school	rankings	are	derived) ‘high-stakes’ because they can be 
used by non-elected agents to create a marketplace for privatization and school choice 
where	there	had	not	been	one	previously.	Moreover,	in	sorting	schools	according	to	
how	well	students	performed	on	compulsory	standardized	provincial	examinations,	the	
Fraser	institute	developed	an	accounting	tool	that	exacted	an	“extraordinary	impact	on	
the	life	world	of	educators	[by]	establishing	what	is	normal	and	what	is	not	[and]	what	
is	necessary	and	what	 is	peripheral”	 in	 the	operation	and	accountability	of	 schools	
(Pignatelli,	2002,	p.	172).	in	this	regard,	we	agree	that	the	Fraser	institute’s	published	
school	rankings	reconfigure	what,	Brighenti	(2007),	described	as	“the	epistemology	
of	seeing”	(p.	323).	According	to	Brighenti	(2007)	the	epistemology	of	seeing	defines	
fields	of	visibility	on	which	human	activity	 is	perceived	and	 judged—contextually.	
For	many	people	it	is	through	school	rankings	that	they	come	to	know,	evaluate,	and	
recognize	what	‘good’	schools	are	according	to	a	particular	epistemology	of	seeing—
an	epistemology	presented	by	the	Fraser	institute	through	its	school	ranking	discourse.
Within,	we	illustrate	how	disciplinary	power	operates	on	the	fields	of	accountability	and	
judgment	through	the	Fraser	institute’s	manufactured	school-ranking	rubric	by	drawing	
principally	on	the	theoretical	testimony	of	Michel	Foucault	(1977,	1980,	1994),	as	well	
as	the	related	work	of	other	scholars.	Next,	we	outline	the	methodological	approach	
used	 in	 this	 study	with	a	particular	 emphasis	on	critical	discourse	analysis	 (CdA).	
We	note	how	semiotic	 ranking	discourses	have	operated	within	 the	 school	 ranking	
‘report	card’	with	a	particular	emphasis	on	how	the	rubric	changed	over	time.	Here	we	
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cite	the	specific	example	of	gender-	and	exam-based	KPis	to	illustrate	how	statistical	
categories	were	created	by	 the	Fraser	 institute	 to	highlight	and	conceal	differences	
between	schools.	our	focus	here	is	not in critiquing the myriad of complex statistical 
equations	the	Fraser	institute	developed	to	measure	the	overall	quality	of	secondary	
schools	as	a	statistician	might;	but	rather,	we	examine	how	the	language	and	categories	
of	statistical	rankings	have	been	used	by	the	Fraser	institute	as	a	discursive	strategy	to	
tell	particular	kinds	of	stories	about	schools.	Finally,	we	note	that	the	‘report	card’	is	
evidence	that	private	organizations	(like	the	Fraser	institute)—when	assembled	with	
the	media—can	influence	public	educational	policy	in	British	Columbia	and	within	
the	broader	field	of	political	power	in	at	least	two	ways:	(1)	when	language	is	used	
to	mediate	relationships	of	disciplinary	power	through	published	school	report	cards,	
and	(2)	when	technologies	of	representation	inform,	shape,	and	manage	the	field	of	
visibility through surveillance.
THE fRASER INSTITUTE AS A NEO-LIBERAL THINk TANk
Advocacy	 think	 tanks	were	 born	 out	 of	 the	 policy	 institute	movement	 of	 the	mid-
1970s	and	1980s	and	marketed	their	ideas	to	target	audiences	(Abelson,	2002).	They	
sought	to	accomplish	specific	political	agendas	and	worked	hard	to	see	their	socio-
political visions realized.
Founders	 of	 advocacy	 think	 tanks	 understood	 the	 importance	 of	 immersing	
themselves in the political arena. Ideas in hand, they began to think strategically 
about	how	to	most	effectively	influence	policy	makers,	the	public,	and	the	media.	
it	 also	 stressed	 the	 importance	 of	marketing	 its	 ideas	 to	 the	media	 (Abelson,	
2002,	p.	31).
it	was	during	this	era	 that	 the	Fraser	institute	was	founded.	increasingly	concerned	
by	 the	 federal	 government’s	 economic	 policies,	 Patrick	 Boyle,	 a	 senior	 industrial	
executive,	 began	 considering	 how	 best	 to	 inform	Canadians	 about	 the	 crucial	 role	
markets	and	deregulation	could	play	in	promoting	economic	development	(Abelson,	
2002).	 Boyle’s	 goal	was	 to	 counter	 the	 left-leaning	 politic	 of	 then	 Prime	Minister	
Pierre	Elliott	Trudeau,	who	once	 told	 the	 nation	 in	 his	 annual	Christmas	message,	
“the	marketplace	was	not	a	reliable	economic	institution	and	would	increasingly	have	
to	be	replaced	by	government	action	in	order	to	sustain	the	economic	well-being	of	
Canadians”	(Abelson,	2002,	p.	44).	Boyle’s	vision	was	realized	on	october	21,	1974,	
when	the	federal	government	granted	the	Fraser	institute	a	charter.	in	so	doing,	the	
seeds	for	a	new	political	alliance	were	planted	and	the	crop	yielded	a	potent	hybrid	of	
political	action	that	pushed	“education	and	social	policy	in	conservative	directions”	
(Apple,	 2004,	 p.	 174).	 right-leaning	 alliances	 were	 formed	 between	 seemingly	
disparate	groups	united	in	their	goal	to	shift	“the	educational	debate	onto	their	own	
terrain—the terrain of traditionalism, standardization, productivity, marketization and 
industrial	needs”	(Apple,	1998,	p.	5).	Apple	(2004)	identifies	four	distinct	groups	that	
have emerged as 21st century forces that he feels profoundly shape the educational 
policy landscape. They are: neoliberals, neoconservatives, authoritarian populists 
(fundamentalists),	 and	 “experts	 for	 hire”	 (Apple,	 2004,	 p.	 176).	Each	group	 exerts	
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power	 on	 the	 educational	 field	 to	 varying	 degrees,	 but	 according	 to	Apple	 (1998),	
two	dominant	groups	have	emerged	in	this	period	of	modern	conservative	restoration:	
neoliberals and neoconservatives. While both groups promote educational reform 
agendas that are geared at improving the overall quality of schools, they approach the 
issue from different ideological perspectives.
Neoliberals	are	characterized	as	being	“economic	modernizers	who	want	educational	
policy	 to	 be	 centered	 around	 (sic)	 the	 economy	 [and]	 around	 (sic)	 performance	
objectives”	 (Apple,	 2004,	 p.	 174).	Economic	modernizers	 “see	 schools	 themselves	
as in need of being transformed and made more competitive by placing them into 
marketplaces through voucher plans, tax credits, and other similar marketizing 
strategies”	 (Apple,	 2004,	 p.	 175).	 By	 comparison,	 neoconservatives	 are	 “deeply	
committed	 to	establishing	 tighter	mechanisms	of	control	over	knowledge…through	
national	 or	 state	 curricula	 and	 national	 or	 state-mandated…testing”	 (Apple,	 2004,	
p.	 175).	 Both	 groups	 promote	 socially	 conservative	 beliefs	 that	 “saturate	 our	 very	
consciousness,	so	that	the	educational,	economic	and	social	world	we	see	and	interact	
with,	and	the	commonsense	interpretations	we	put	on	it,	becomes	the	tout	court,	the	
only	world”	(Apple,	2004,	p.	4).
Although neoconservatives and neoliberals make different assumptions about schools 
and	 how	 best	 to	 improve	 them,	 they	 are	 similar	 in	 that	 both	 ideologies	 promote	
their respective agendas through discursive techniques that intersect at the nexus of 
educational	reform.	The	economic	deregulation	agenda	of	neoliberals	(like	the	Fraser	
institute)	shapes	every	policy	reform	initiative	proposed	by	that	particular	advocacy	
think	 tank	 (not	 only	 in	 education)	 but	 in	 health	 care,	 taxation,	 and	 immigration.	
Consider	the	institute’s	published	mission:
our	 vision	 is	 a	 free	 and	 prosperous	 world	 where	 individuals	 benefit	 from	
greater choice, competitive markets, and personal responsibility. Our mission 
is to measure, study, and communicate the impact of competitive markets and 
government	 interventions	 on	 the	 welfare	 of	 individuals	 (The	 Fraser	 institute,	
2010).
The	social	regulation	agenda	of	neoconservatives	(like	British	Columbia’s	Ministry	of	
Education)	shapes	educational	reform	initiatives	by	prescribing	curriculum	and	setting	
compulsory, standardized tests and examinations.
While	the	Ministry	of	Education’s	assessment	policy	has	changed	over	time,	it	presently	
makes	compulsory	skills-based	assessments	at	Grades	4	and	7	in	literacy,	numeracy,	
and	reading	(for	elementary	students)	and	standardized	subject	examinations	in	Grades	
10-12	 (for	 secondary	 students).	Each	 school’s	 achievement	 results	 are	 used	 by	 the	
Fraser	institute	to	construct	an	annual	school	ranking	report	card	that	identifies	low-,	
mid-,	 and	high-ranked	 schools.	Five	different	 iterations	of	 the	 (secondary)	 ‘School 
Report Card’	were	developed	during	the	period	from	1998	to	2010	(Simmonds,	2012).	
They	 had	 in	 common	 the	 inclusion	 of	KPis	 that	were	 derived	 from	data	 collected	
by the British Columbia Ministry of Education on public and private schools alike. 
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This garnered a degree of legitimacy for published school report cards from the 
beginning	because	the	data	was	considered	to	be	reliable	and	valid.	As	well,	school	
rankings derived from government-generated data sources effectively distanced the 
Fraser	institute	from	the	schools	it	reported	on	in	ways	the	Fraser	institute	could	not	
lay	claim	to	if	it	had	collected	the	data	itself.	How	different	schools	are	represented	
on the report card, therefore, is at the core of the school ranking phenomenon but 
these representations are made possible because of the state-sanctioned assessment 
regulations instituted by neoconservative forces. These separate but interdependent 
neo-conservative and neo-liberal ideological forces serve as the backdrop against 
which	 the	 school	 ranking	 phenomenon	first	 emerged	 in	British	Columbia	 in	 1998.	
Moreover, they continue to shape the school accountability landscape to this day.
fOUCAULT AND SCHOOL RANkINgS
Foucault‘s	understanding	that	régimes	of	truth	were	manufactured	in	the	social	realm	
to	promote	political	 agendas—and	 that	not	every	citizen	was	equally	 served	 in	 the	
process—is	an	insight	that	still	resonates.	He	understood	that	power	extended	beyond	
state	imposed	limits	when	he	said,	“for	all	[its]	omnipotence	[the	state’s]	apparatuses	
is	far	from	being	able	to	occupy	the	whole	field	of	actual	power	relations…because	
the	 state	 can	 only	 operate	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 other,	 already-existing	 power	 relations”	
(Foucault,	1994,	p.	77).	Foucault	noted	that	non-state	agents	can—and	do—operate	
within	the	broader	field	of	power	to	exert	influence.	This	implies	that	power	is	not	a	
matter	of	consent,	and	that	power	is	exercised	in	relation	to	existing	power	dynamics	
and	enmeshed	networks	of	connectivity.	it	also	implies	that	disciplinary	power	(power	
that	disciplines)	is	everywhere	and	operates	in	relation	to	human	fields	of	activity.
in	writing	about	the	17th	century	Panopticon	developed	by	Jeremy	Bentham,	Foucault	
noted that its essential	architectural	function	allowed	a	few	“overseers”	to	effectively	
monitor	 and	 scrutinize	 the	 behaviour	 of	 many	 prisoners	 (Foucault,	 1980,	 p.	 155).	
Foucault	(1977)	described	the	effect	panoptic	architecture	had	on	human	behaviour.
Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of 
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of 
power.	That	 this	 architectural	 apparatus	 should	be	 a	machine	 for	 creating	and	
sustaining	a	power	relation	independent	of	the	person	who	exercises	it;	in	short,	
that	 the	 inmates	 should	 be	 caught	 up	 in	 a	 power	 situation	 of	which	 they	 are	
themselves	the	bearers	(Foucault,	1977,	p.	201).
We	argue	 that	modern	school	 rankings	act	 like	17th	 century	Panoptic	prison	 towers	
because	they	operationalize	power	in	similar	ways.	Both	constructs	serve	as	instruments	
of	disciplinary	power	that	have	been	manufactured	to	monitor	and	scrutinize	human	
activity, albeit it different kinds of human activity. In its 21st century extension 
Haggerty	and	Ericson	(2006)	argued	that	panoptic	power	ought	to	be	augmented	by	
synoptic	surveillance	mechanisms.	“Synopticism	involves	the	ability	of	a	large	group	
of	people	to	scrutinize	the	actions	of	a	few	individuals”	(Haggerty	&	Ericson,	2006,	
p.	28).	Synopticism,	therefore,	functions	as	an	aggregate	of	panoptic	power	through	
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contemporary mass media because the detailed actions of groups are made public 
through	newspapers,	 television,	and	online	accounts	 in	 the	new	politic	of	visibility.	
Here,	we	would	note	that	synopticism,	as	we	are	using	it,	is	related	to	ideas	of	network	
governance	 (Ball,	 2009)	 through	 the	 mediatization	 of	 education	 policy	 (Lingard	
and	rawolle,	 2004);	 and	 synopticism	 is	 related	 to	what	Webb	 (2011)	 discussed	 as	
“governmentality	constellations”	and	to	what	deleuze	(1990)	discussed	as	“societies	
of	control.”	However,	Foucault’s	central	argument	that	panopticism	was	an	essential	
component	of	disciplinary	power	because	it	contributed	significantly	to	its	production	
as	a	mechanism	(or	instrument)	of	power,	is	something	that	we	feel	is	operating	within	
published	school	rankings—synoptically.	For	 instance,	consider	what	Haggerty	and	
Ericson	(2006)	observed	about	synoptic	data-gathering	in	the	new	politic	of	visibility:
[s]urveillance	 technologies…operate	 through	 processes	 of	 disassembling	 and	
reassembling.	 People	 are	 broken	 down	 into	 a	 series	 of	 discrete	 informational	
flows,	 which	 are	 stabilized	 and	 captured	 according	 to	 a	 pre-established	
classification	 criteria.	They	 are	 then	 transported	 to	 centralized	 locations	 to	 be	
reassembled	and	combined	in	ways	that	serve	institutional	agendas	(Haggerty	&	
Ericson,	2006,	p.	4).
We argue that this understanding of surveillance theory is fundamentally no different 
from	how	data	is	gathered	about	students	in	British	Columbia.	The	Ministry	discloses	
individual	student	 results	 to	parents	and	school	administrators	 (disassembling	data)	
while	the	Fraser	institute	repackages	(reassembles)	the	collective	experience	of	entire	
groups	 of	 students	 for	 publication	 in	 provincial	 newspapers	 and	 online,	within	 the	
broader	field	of	power.
A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS (CDA) Of SECONDARY 
SCHOOL RANkINgS
Given	 the	 fourteen-year	 monopoly	 the	 Fraser	 institute	 has	 on	 ranking	 schools	 in	
British Columbia a central question becomes: What is the Fraser Institute ranking of 
schools phenomenon a case of?
Case	 study	 research	 is	 particularly	 appropriate	 for	 situations	 in	 which	 the	
examination and understanding of context is important. Multiple sources of 
evidence are used and the data collections techniques include document and text 
analysis”	(darke	&	Shanks,	2002,	p.	113).
Yin	(2003)	described	the	 important	need	for	case	study	researchers	 to	use	different	
sources	of	information	as	a	way	to	ensure	the	investigation	is	valid.	Multiple	sources	
of	 evidence	develop	 “converging lines of inquiry,	 a	 process	of	 triangulation”	 (Yin,	
2003,	p.	98).	“When	you	have	really	triangulated	the	data,	the	events	or	facts	of	the	
case	 study	 have	 been	 supported	 by	 more	 than	 a	 single	 source	 of	 evidence”	 (Yin,	
2003,	p.	99).	Using	both	qualitative	and	quantitative	evidence	derived	from	primary,	
secondary,	and	tertiary	source	documents	helps	establish	the	validity	of	the	findings	
presented here.
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Table	 1	 lists	 the	 documents	 that	were	 analyzed	 in	 this	 study.	 Each	 document	may	
be	 considered	 a	 discursive	 event	 that	 has	 three	 dimensions:	 (1)	 it	 is	 a	 spoken	 or	
written	text;	(2)	it	 is	an	instance	of	discourse	practice	involving	the	production	and	
interpretation	of	texts;	and	(3)	it	is	a	part	of	a	broader	socio-political	context	(rogers,	
Malancharuvil-Berkes,	Mosley,	Hui,	&	o’Garro	 Joseph,	 2005).	Taken	 collectively,	
these	 documents	may	 be	 considered,	what	 Smith	 (2001),	 called	 “organizing	 texts”	
(Smith,	2001,	p.	174).
Table 1. Documents and Reports Analyzed in CDA (1998-2010)
Primary Fraser	institute	produced:
report	Cards	on	British	Columbia’s	Secondary	Schools
Annual Reports
Fraser	Forum	magazine	articles
Media produced:
Local,	provincial,	and	national	newspaper	articles
National	magazine	articles
Local,	regional,	and	provincial	newsletters
Secondary British Columbia Ministry of Education produced:
School and District Reports
Federation	of	independent	School	Association	(FiSA)	generated	data
Teritary interviews
radio	and	print	interviews
Webcasts
Online debates
At	 its	 core	a	CdA	not	only	examines	“the	nature	of	 social	power	and	dominance”	
(van	dijk,	 1993,	 p.	 254),	 but	 it	 also	 “focuses	 on	 how	 language	 as	 a	 cultural	 tool	
mediates	relationships	of	power	and	privilege	in	social	interactions,	institutions,	and	
bodies	of	knowledge”	(rogers,	et	al.,	2005).	van	dijk	(1993)	argues	that	power	and	
dominance can be institutionalized to enhance their effectiveness and can be sustained 
and reproduced by the media. This is an important insight because it highlights a 
principal	argument	we	make	through	a	CdA	of	the	Fraser	institute’s	published	ranking	
of	secondary	schools—that	dominant	discourses	shape	public	opinion	and	“facilitate	
the	formation	of	social	representations”	(van	dijk,	1993,	p.	259).	in	other	words,	a	
CdA	reveals	how	agents	“enact,	or	otherwise	‘exhibit’	their	power	in	discourse”	(van	
dijk,	1993,	p.	259).	
Published	school	rankings	served	as	a	primary	source	of	data	for	this	project	and	were	
relevant	because	they	exemplified	what	Smith	(2001)	calls	“the	textual	mediation	of	
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people’s	(sic)	activities	through	standardized	and	standardizing	genres”	(Smith,	2001,	
p.	173).	Textual mediation,	therefore,	creates	artefacts	that	stem	from	“the	coordinating	
machinery	 of	 organization	 and	 institution”	 (Smith,	 2001,	 p.	 174).	 For	 the	 purpose	
of this study textual mediation	 principally	 takes	 the	 form	of	published	 (secondary)	
school	report	cards	that	utilize	KPis.	We	draw	extensively	on	Fraser	institute	produced	
school	reports	that	describe	in	detail	how	ranking	iterations	were	manufactured	over	
time.	As	well,	the	analysis	of	other	policy	documents	and	annual	reports	published	by	
the	Fraser	institute	established	prevailing	ideological	stances	this	particular	advocacy	
think	tank	promoted.	Finally,	in	exploring	how	rankings	changed	over	time,	a	CdA	
made	possible	 an	 examination	 of	 how	published	 school	 rankings	 overexerted	 their	
authority	on	the	accountability	field	by	promoting	neo-liberal	ideologies	that	privilege	
certain	kinds	of	schools.	Here	we	illustrate	how	subsequent	alterations	of	KPis—to	
specifically	include	gender	and	citizenship—reconfigured	the	field	of	accountability	
for	co-educational	schools	by	focusing	on	two	questions:	(1)	how	have	the	statistical	
components	of	 the	Fraser	 institute’s	 secondary	 school	 ranking	 in	British	Columbia	
changed	over	time?	and,	(2)	how	do	manufactured	school	rankings	shape	the	field	of	
visibility	through	which	secondary	schools	are	viewed?
MANUfACTURINg STATISTICAL REgIMES Of TRUTH
initially,	 the	 Fraser	 institute	 devised	 a	 secondary	 school	 report	 card	 because	 there	
was	“no	uniform	system	for	evaluating	the	performance	of	schools	in	the	province”	
of	British	Columbia	(Cowley,	et	al.,	1998,	p.	4).	Moreover,	the	institute	noted	that	no	
evaluative	 procedure	was	 contemplated	 by	 the	Ministry	 of	Education	 to	 determine	
how	well	the	school	system	worked.	“The	only	way	to	find	out	whether	our	schools	
are	 doing	 their	 job	 satisfactorily”,	 the	 authors	 of	 the	first	 school	 report	 card	 noted	
was,	“to	measure	results	in	an	objective	and	quantifiable	way”	(Cowley,	et	al.,	1998,	
p.	 4).	As	well,	 the	 data-driven	 initiative	 of	 a	 school-ranking	 rubric	 resonated	with	
the	Fraser	 institute’s	 emphasis	 on	measurability	 given	 its	 institutional	motto,	 “if	 it	
matters,	measure	it”	(Levant,	2005,	p.	A19).	
in	the	thirteen	years	of	data	that	inform	this	analysis,	five	key	iterations	of	the	Fraser	
institute’s	published	secondary	school	ranking	report	were	identified.	in	his	doctoral	
study	 Simmonds	 (2012)	 documented	 the	 changes	 associated	 with	 each	 successive	
school	ranking	iteration	devised	by	the	Fraser	institute	to	say	something	‘objective’ 
about	schools	from	1998-2010.	He	noted	that	five	of	 the	original	KPis	used	by	the	
Fraser	institute	to	construct	its	inaugural	school-ranking	rubric	in	1998	have	remained	
constant	throughout.	They	are:	(1)	average	exam	mark,	(2)	percentage	of	exams	failed,	
(3)	school	vs.	exam	mark	difference,	(4)	exams	taken	per	student,	and	(5)	graduation	
rate.	These	KPis	were	uniformly	applied	to	every	secondary	school	included	in	the	
ranking.	However,	when	data	presented	in	one	of	 the	Fraser	institute’s	own	studies	
deemed	 that	 “it	 was	 boys	who	were	 getting	 short-changed”	 in	 British	 Columbia’s	
classrooms	 (Cowley	&	Easton,	 1999,	 p.	 3)	 a	 gender	 gap	KPi	was	 included	 in	 the	
second	(and	each	successive)	ranking	iteration	beginning	in	2001.	The	introduction	
of	 gender-related-data	 by	 the	Fraser	 institute	 alluding	 to	 gender-biased-teaching	 in	
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secondary	 schools	 effectively	 expanded	 the	 field	 of	 visibility	 on	which	 the	 school	
wide	accountability	game	was	played.	Henceforward,	boys	and	girls	could	be	seen	as	
separate	populations	where	they	were	otherwise	blended	together	as	a	single	student	
population	 in	 the	first	 iteration	of	 the	 report	 card.	This	was	 strategically	 important	
because in pointing to discrepant educational experiences boys and girls seemed to be 
having	in	British	Columbia’s	high	schools,	the	Fraser	institute	introduced	a	new	visual	
asymmetry	 to	 the	 greater	 field	 of	 school	wide	 accountability.	This	 is	 an	 important	
development	 in	 the	 school	 ranking’s	 evolution	 given	 that	 fields	 are,	 by	 definition,	
socially	constructed	areas	of	activity	where	struggles	take	place	between	agents	in	a	
supply	and	demand	market.	Brighenti	(2007)	reminds	us	of	this	point:
[W]hen	something	becomes	more	visible	or	less	visible	than	before,	we	should	
ask	ourselves	who	 is	acting	on	and	 reacting	 to	 the	properties	of	 the	field,	and	
which	specific	relationships	are	being	shaped.	Shaping	and	managing	visibility	
is	huge	work	 that	human	beings	do	 tirelessly.	As	communication	 technologies	
enlarge	the	field	of	the	socially	visible,	visibility	becomes	a	supply	and	demand	
market.	At	any	enlargement	of	the	field,	the	question	arises	of	what	is	worth	being	
seen	at	which	price—along	with	the	normative	question	of	what	should	and	what	
should not be seen. These questions are never simply a technical matter: they are 
inherently	practical	and	political	(Brighenti,	2007,	p.	327).
Whereas	 the	first	 school	 ranking	 report	 reflected	and	highlighted	what	 local	 critics	
noted	 were	 social	 class	 distinctions	 that	 existed	 between	 schools	 (Proctor,	 1998;	
Steffenhagen,	 2002;	 Steffenhagen	 2003),	 the	 introduction	 of	 gender	 data	 into	 the	
school	wide	accountability	issue	reflected	and	highlighted	gender-based	distinctions	
the	 Fraser	 institute	 wanted	 the	 general	 public	 to	 see	 was	 operating	 in	 secondary	
schools	 (Cowley	 2003;	Cowley	&	Easton,	 1999).	 Expanding	 the	 field	 of	 visibility	
to	include	gender-related	data	in	this	way	effectively	marked—what	was	previously	
an	unmarked—social	category.	This	was	an	important	strategy	because	as	Brighenti	
(2007)	noted,	“[o]nce	a	way	of	marking	and	dividing	people	is	set	up…the	resulting	
classification	 is	a	 tool	 that	can	be	applied	 to	every	case”	(Brighenti,	2007,	p.	334).	
Therefore,	the	effect	of	the	Fraser	institute	reconfiguring	entire	school	populations	into	
gender-constructed,	sub-populations	was	to	cast	a	wider	statistical	net	that	captured	
public-private	 school	 distinctions,	 which	 otherwise	 remained	 hidden	 from	 public	
view.	in	this	way,	the	Fraser	institute	effectively	amplified	its	power	of	surveillance	
on	 the	field	of	visibility	by	widening	 its	 scope	of	vision.	Whereas	 the	first	 ranking	
iteration	 made	 possible	 between-school	 comparisons,	 the	 second	 iteration	 made	
possible	within-school	 (gender-based)	 comparisons	 that	 pitted	 boys	 against	 girls—
and by implication, public schools against private schools because all of the single 
sex	schools	ranked	by	the	Fraser	institute	were	de	facto	private/independent	schools.
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For	instance,	Figure	1	depicts	five	years	of	school	ranking	data	as	published	by	the	
Fraser	institute	during	its	first	two	iterations.	it	shows	how	public	(PU)	and	private/
independent	(PV)	schools	were	distributed,	and	re-distributed,	across	decile	ranges	for	
iteration	#1	(1998-2000)	and	iteration	#2	(2001-2002)	respectively.
figure 1. Distribution of public (PU) and private/independent (PV) schools for 
iterations #1 and #2 achieveing ‘top’ decile ranking scores. 
Source:	The	Fraser	institute’s	report	Card	on	British	Columbia’s	Secondary	Schools	(1998-
2002).
What is important to note here is the relative percentage of public schools that occupied 
the ‘top’	decile	range	in	the	Fraser	institute’s	ranking	during	the	first	iteration	(1998-
2000)	compared	to	the	relative	percentage	of	public	schools	that	occupied	the	same	
‘top’	decile	 range	during	 the	 second	 iteration.	The	graph	shows	 that	before	gender	
gap	indices	were	included	in	the	ranking	rubric	approximately	5%	of	all the public 
schools	 then	 ranked	by	 the	Fraser	 institute	achieved	 ‘top’	 scores.	After	gender	gap	
indices	were	introduced	by	the	Fraser	institute	in	2001,	the	percentage	of	‘top’	ranked	
public	schools	occupying	the	same	decile	range	dropped	to	0.4%.	This	represents	a	
92%	decline	in	the	number	of	potential	public	schools	that	achieved	scores	within	the	
9.0-10.0	range.	By	way	of	comparison,	before	gender	gap	indices	were	included	in	the	
ranking	rubric	approximately	31%	of	all	private/independent	schools	then	ranked	by	
the	Fraser	institute	achieved	‘top’	scores.	After	gender	gap	indices	were	introduced,	
the	percentage	of	‘top’	ranked	private/independent	schools	occupying	the	same	‘top’	
decile	range	dropped	to	approximately	21%.	This	decline	represents	a	34%	decline	in	
the	number	of	‘top’	ranked	private/independent	schools.	So	while	public	and	private	
school	 systems	were	 both	 adversely	 affected	by	 the	 introduction	of	 a	 new	 ranking	
rubric	 that	 included	 gender	 gap	 indices	 during	 iteration	 #2,	 public	 schools	 fared	
significantly	worse	as	a	result.
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Another	way	the	school	ranking	rubric	in	British	Columbia	exerted	disciplinary	power	
was	how	it	statistically	concealed	an	entire	population	of	students.	The	international	
expansion	 of	British	Columbia’s	 high	 school	 graduation	 program	 into	 Pacific-rim	
countries	was	perceived	by	many	to	be	a	lucrative	business	venture	by	the	Ministry	of	
Education	that	would	subsidize	the	high	cost	of	public	education	(Kuehn,	2002,	p.	1).	
And	while	schools,	and	school	districts,	may	have	benefited	from	the	added	revenue	
foreign	 English	 Second	 Language	 (ESL)	 students	 brought	 into	 the	 public	 school	
system, their overall impact on resulting school rankings did not. This problematic 
situation	was	 resolved	when	 the	 Fraser	 institute	 established	 a	 third	 iteration	 of	 its	
school	report	card	in	2003—one	that	would	statistically	negate	the	impact	foreign	ESL	
students	had	on	a	school’s	English	12	examination	results.	All	that	was	required	for	
the	Fraser	institute	was	to	recast	its	statistical	net	by	“refining	the	student	cohort”	on	
which	school	rankings	would	be	based	(Cowley	&	Easton,	2003,	p.	4).	The	rationale	
of	incorporating	this	statistical	refinement	into	the	school	ranking	rubric	was	noted	by	
the	authors	of	the	school	‘report	card’:
Administrators	were	also	concerned	that	while	they	were	being	encouraged	by	
the	ministry	to	recruit	international	students	as	a	means	by	which	to	earn	revenue	
for	the	operation	of	their	schools,	these	transient	students’	academic	results	were	
not	necessarily	reflective	of	the	quality	of	teaching	at	the	school.	Administrators	
encouraged	us	to	explore	ways	to	rate	the	schools	only	on	the	basis	of	students	
normally resident in British Columbia. We believe that this is a reasonable 
refinement	 of	 our	 approach	 and,	 using	 revised	 data	 provided	 by	 the	ministry,	
have	excluded	 these	 students’	 results	 from	 the	calculation	 (Cowley	&	Easton,	
2003,	p.	4).
Embedded	within	a	model	for	schooling	that	seeks	to	increase	revenue	streams	in	this	
way	is	an	alignment	of	public	policy	initiatives	with	the	Fraser	institute’s	mission	of	
privatizing public education through choice-based reforms. The offshore interest of 
foreign students choosing British Columbian schools can be seen through a business 
lens	 as	 a	 lucrative	 niche	market	 to	 be	 developed	 by	 the	 government.	However,	 an	
unintended consequence of attracting the same population of foreign ESL students 
to	British	Columbian	secondary	schools	is	that	their	collective	school-wide	presence	
adversely	affected	a	school’s	overall	ranking.	The	Fraser	institute	effectively	managed	
the	 situation	 by	 removing	 the	 statistical	 impact	 foreign	 students	 had	 on	 a	 school’s	
ranking position thereby rendering an entire population of students invisible.
THE MEDIA’S ROLE IN CIRCULATINg kNOWLEDgE 
DISCOURSES: SYNOPTICISM AND SCHOOL MARkETS
in	an	editorial	that	appeared	on	the	front	page	of	a	provincial	newspaper,	the	Fraser	
institute’s	rationale	for	publishing	the	first	school	ranking	‘report	card’	the	previous	
spring	was	clearly	articulated	and	positioned	within	a	discursive	strategy	that	privileged	
a	parent’s	right	to	know.	The Province	newspaper	made	clear	its	position	about	where	
it	stood	in	the	ranking	debate	in	an	“exclusive	report”	when	it	said:
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By	referring	to	the	report	card,	which	was	prepared	by	the	prestigious	Vancouver-
based	Fraser	institute,	parents	will	have	information	they	need	to	decide	if	their	
school’s	doing	a	good	job.	And	they	can	do	something	about	it	(Editorial,	1999,	
p.	A1).
Establishing	a	partnership	with	a	provincial	newspaper	was	critical	 in	order	for	 the	
Fraser	institute	to	gain	a	stronghold	on	shaping	the	discourse	on	educational	matters	
because	it	provided	the	partisan	think	tank	with	direct	access	to	a	significant	population	
within	British	Columbia	who	were	 already	 loyal	Province readers.	The	 newspaper	
publication	also	provided	its	readership	with	an	artefact	of	the	ranking	itself	because	
the tables generated by the school ranking report could be saved. In a statement 
published	 in	 the	Fraser	 institute’s	2000	Annual	report,	 then	Board	Chair,	Mr.	ray	
Addington,	further	qualified	the	importance	of	establishing	a	relationship	between	the	
Fraser	institute	and	the	media	when	he	noted:
The	distribution	of	 the	report	card	has	been	a	critical	 factor,	since	we	want	 to	
ensure that every educator, parent, and child in the province has access to the 
results.	Accordingly,	in	each	province	we	have	chosen	to	partner	with	a	widely	
distributed	newspaper	or	magazine.	in	British	Columbia,	we	chose	The Province, 
the	newspaper	with	the	largest	circulation	in	BC,	and	a	demographic	appropriate	
to	our	goal	(The	Fraser	institute,	2002,	p.	2).
in	mobilizing	the	media	in	this	way,	the	Fraser	institute	effectively	managed	to	direct	
parents’	attention	on	what	mattered	most	to	the	Fraser	institute—measuring	specific	
aspects	 of	 school	 performance.	 That	 regional	 newspapers	 throughout	 the	 province	
re-published the rankings of their regional schools underscores the in-roads the 
Fraser	institute	made	into	the	public’s	collective	consciousness	about	why	the	school	
ranking	mattered.	For	by	the	spring	of	2000,	school	rankings	clearly	mattered	in	the	
province	of	British	Columbia.	They	mattered	enough	that	Fraser	institute	ranking	data	
(originally	published	in	a	provincial	newspaper	some	ten	to	fourteen	days	earlier)	was	
re-published	in	local	papers	with	comments	from	local	and	regional	school	authorities	
discussing	alternatives	to	the	media’s	coverage.
SCHOOL MARkETS AND THE POLITICS Of SPACE
in	the	September	2003	issue	of	the	Fraser	Forum	entitled,	‘Who owns your education?’, 
Peter	Cowley	published	an	article	called,	‘An End to Catchment Area Feudalism’. In it 
Cowley	described	a	“recent	amendment”	to	British	Columbia’s	School	Act	(Cowley,	
2003,	p.	10).	At	its	core,	the	amendment	empowered	parents	to	enrol	their	children	
in	any	public	school	 they	chose.	Cowley	supported	 the	amendment	wholeheartedly	
because	 it	 marked	 a	 significant	 step	 by	 the	 then	 Liberal	 government	 of	 British	
Columbia	toward	reforming	public	education	in	ways	the	Fraser	institute	had	always	
promoted	and	supported;	that	is	to	say,	the	amendment	helped	create	a	market-driven	
educational	 system	 that	 allowed	parents	 to	choose	between	public	 schools,	 in	part,	
because	 the	 Fraser	 institute	 provided	 a	 ranking	mechanism	which	made	 between-
school	comparisons	possible.	Cowley’s	endorsement	of	 the	School	Act	amendment	
was	obvious:
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School	boards	may	no	longer	enact	policies	that	require	students	to	enroll	(sic)	in	
a	specific	school	based	solely	on	their	place	of	residence.	Neither	may	the	boards	
vest in their superintendents the authority to direct student placement based on 
their	 judgment	 of	 program	 suitability…This	 amendment	 assures	 that	 parents,	
not	 school	 boards	 or	 superintendents,	 decide	 which	 school	 is	 best	 for	 their	
children…British	Columbia	joins	only	two	other	provinces,	Quebec	and	Alberta,	
in	providing	statutory	support	for	parental	choice	within	the	public	school	system	
(Cowley,	2003,	p.	10).
This	statement	is	relevant	because	it	shifts	the	school-wide	accountability	framework	
away	from	discursive	practices	anchored	in	a	parent’s right to know	toward	discursive	
practices	 that	were	more	concretely	anchored	in	a	parent’s right to choose and that 
these	discursive	practices	corresponded	to	greater	shifts	in	the	field	of	political	power.	
Evidence	for	the	public’s	perception	that	private	school	education	was	preferable	to	
public school education can be found in an article that appeared in the December issue 
of The Vancouver Sun (december	15,	2004).	it	was	noted	that	“despite	a	steady	decline	
in	the	school-aged	population,	independent	school	enrolments	climbed	by	8.8%	during	
the	past	five	years	while	public	school	numbers	have	fallen	by	3.4%”	(Steffenhagen,	
2004,	p.	B1).	This	claim	is	supported	by	data	obtained	from	the	Ministry	of	Education	
of	British	Columbia	Annual	reports	(1998-2003)	as	published	on	the	Federation	of	
independent	Schools	Association	(FiSA)	website.
Figure	2	depicts	the	annual	percentage	growth	in	private/independent	school	student	
enrolment	 data	 from	 1997-2010.	 it	 shows	 positive	 growth	 in	 student	 populations	
attending	private/independent	schools	in	every	year	except	in	2000/01	where	there	was	
no	change.	it	also	shows	that	since	1997	private/independent	school	student	enrolment	
within	British	Columbia	has	increased	by	24.6	percentage	points—an	average	growth	
rate	of	+1.76%.
By	comparison,	Figure	3	depicts	the	annual	percentage	growth	in	public	school	student	
enrolment	during	 the	 same	period.	 it	 shows	positive	growth	 in	 student	populations	
attending	public	schools	for	1996/97	and	1997/98,	but	an	overall	negative	growth	in	
student	 enrolment	 of	 -6.1%	 thereafter.	The	 average	 student	 population	 growth	 rate	
for	the	same	sample	of	schools	was	-0.43%	between	1997	and	2010.	These	student	
enrolment	 trends	 occur—not	 only	 in	 relation	 to	 British	 Columbia’s	 documented	
average	population	growth	of	+1.07%	for	the	same	time	period	(BC	Stats,	2013)—but	
in	relation	to	an	overall	10.8%	average	increase	in	the	percentage	of	persons	living	in	
British	Columbia	who	earned	$100,000	and	more	from	2001-2010	(Statistics	Canada,	
2013).
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figure 2: Percentage annual growth in student enrolment for private/independent 
schools (1997-2010)
Source:	(The	Federation	of	independent	Schools,	2010).
figure 3: Percentage annual growth in student enrolment for public schools (1997-2010)
Source:	(The	Federation	of	independent	Schools,	2010).
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Moreover, student enrolment patterns in private/independent and public schools have 
grown	and	decreased	respectively	at	average	greater	rates	since	the	School	Act	was	
amended	 in	2003	 to	allow	for	cross-boundary	enrolment.	These	 trends	suggest	 that	
a	correlation	link	exists	between	the	manufacturing	and	publication	of	league	tables	
since	1998	and	student	enrolment	patterns.	For	one	school	principal	the	impact	school	
choice	had	on	school	enrolment	patterns	was	clear	when	he	said:
Changes	to	Section	74	of	the	School	Act	[in	2003]	now	permit	students	to	enrol	
in	the	school	of	their	choice.	As	families	exercise	choice,	what	were	once	firm	
boundaries	 are	 now	 considerably	 blurred.	As	 a	 result	 of	 student	 choice	 and	
declining	enrolment,	we	now	have	under-enrolment	in	some	elementary	schools	
and	capacity	pressures	in	others	(McMartin,	2010,	p.	A4).
in	 the	next	section	we	revisit	 the	 theoretical	commitments	of	 the	study	and	discuss	
them in relation to the local context. 
DISCIPLINARY POWER IS ExERCISED THROUgH PUBLISHED 
SCHOOL REPORT CARDS
Statistical	régimes	of	truth	exercise	disciplinary	power	on	the	field	of	accountability	
because	 they	 have	 been	 manufactured	 in	 ways	 that	 highlight,	 amplify,	 and	 hide	
visibility	asymmetries	between	schools.	When	the	Fraser	institute	began	to	treat	single	
sex schools differently from co-educational schools, its report card operationalized 
power	in	ways	that	reconfigured	the	field	of	politics	for	co-educational	schools.	This	
finding	highlights	an	inherent	limitation	embedded	within	the	Fraser	institute’s	school	
ranking rubric—namely that different kinds of schools are treated in different kinds of 
ways	by	an	imposed	statistical	régime	of	truth	that	is	promoted	as	being	objective.	in	
this case the logic of the ranking is bifurcated by gender. Co-educational schools are 
‘rewarded’	when	boys	and	girls	achieve	similar	school-	and	exam-based	results,	but	
they are ‘penalized’ if this statistical expectation is not achieved. Single sex schools 
could not be ‘rewarded’ or ‘penalized’	in	the	same	way	because	gender-related	KPis	
were	not	applicable	to	those	kinds	of	schools.	Treating	single	sex	and	co-educational	
schools	differently	in	this	way	had	a	profound	effect	on	the	distribution	of	‘top’ ranked 
public and private schools in British Columbia. 
This	finding	has	received	very	little	attention	in	public	debates	or	in	the	mainstream	
press,	but	it	is	an	important	one	because	it	illustrates	how	school	rankings	fragment	the	
field	of	education	on	which	schools	are	now	‘seen’	as	competing.	This	fragmentation	
disrupts	(what	could	have	been	previously	been	called)	a	level	playing	field	because	
(for	 the	 first	 time)	 gender	 differences	 begin	 to	 account	 for	 some	 of	 the	 statistical	
variation	that	exists	between	schools.	Without	exception,	every	single	sex	school	in	
British Columbia is a de facto private school. With the introduction of gender gap 
achievement	 indices	 into	 the	 school	 ranking	 rubric	 came	with	 it	 a	 perception	 that	
private	 schools	were	 overall	 ‘better’	 than	 their	 public	 school	 counterparts	 because	
there	were	more	of	them	occupying	‘top’	ranked	spots	in	the	Fraser	institute’s	school	
report card.
36
Accountability synopticism
The	report	card	was	also	designed	to	conceal	the	impact	some	groups	of	students	had	on	
a	school’s	overall	ranking.	When	ranking	results	began	to	slip	for	some	public	British	
Columbian schools because they had recruited fee-paying, foreign ESL students into 
their	populations,	the	Fraser	institute	recast	its	statistical	net	by	“refining	the	student	
cohort”	on	which	school	rankings	themselves	were	based	(Cowley	&	Easton,	2003,	p.	
4).	The	Fraser	institute’s	school	report	card	policy	of	including	the	compulsory	English	
12 provincial examination results of all Grade 12 students changed to accommodate 
a foreign student recruitment policy initiated by the Ministry. Including KPIs that 
statistically account for the impact of gender gap differences and government-initiated 
foreign	student	recruitment	policies	while	(at	the	same	time)	choosing	not to include 
KPIs that statistically account for contextual influences	in	students	like,	socioeconomic	
disparities, is problematic. In casting, and recasting, the school ranking rubric that 
makes	visible	(and	conceals)	entire	groups	of	students	within	secondary	schools,	the	
Fraser	 institute	 focuses	 the	public’s	 gaze	on	what	 it wants	 the	public	 to	 see.	 in	 so	
doing,	the	Fraser	institute	exercises	a	kind	of	disciplinary	power	that	may	be	viewed	
by some as being discretionary and discriminatory at its core.
AgENTS DEPLOY LANgUAgE IN WAYS THAT MEDIATE AND 
REPOSITION RELATIONSHIPS Of POWER
The	 Fraser	 institute	 depicted	 market-driven	 reform	 initiatives	 as	 the	 best	 way	 to	
improve	schools	(The	Fraser	institute,	2010).	initially,	the	school-wide	accountability	
framework	 was	 positioned	 within	 a	 broader	 knowledge discourse that not only 
provided	information	to	consumers	of	education,	but	it	was	devised	to	make	uniform	
comparisons	 between	 public	 and	 private	 high	 schools.	 With	 one	 broad-sweeping	
accountability stroke, published secondary school report cards rendered judgment on 
public	 and	 private	 schools	 alike.	 in	 creating	 a	 report	whereby	 schools	were	 pitted	
against schools under the guise of a parent’s right to know, neighbourhood, district, 
regional,	and	socio-economic	boundaries	were	obliterated	in	a	ranking	that	focused	on	
provincial exam results.
over	time,	the	Fraser	institute	shifted	the	locus	of	attention	away	from	recurring	KPi	
debates	toward	school	improvement	debates.	The	public’s	eye	was	focused	on	reading	
newspaper	accounts	of	schools	that	had	significantly	improved	their	overall	ranking.	
Coded discourses of institutional competence played an important role in changing 
the	contours	of	the	educational	landscape	when	the	School	Act	was	amended	in	2003	
(Simmonds,	2012).	With	the	amendment	came	the	possibility	that—for	the	first	time	
in British Columbia—students could apply for admission to public schools beyond 
the limits imposed by state-designated catchment areas called school districts. The 
state-sanctioned	deregulation	of	school	catchment	areas	in	this	way	changed	school	
enrolment	patterns.	This	finding	is	supported	by	historical	data	provided	by	the	Ministry	
of	Education	and	the	Federation	of	independent	Schools	Association	(FiSA),	as	well	
as	from	anecdotal	evidence	provided	by	principals	who	recognize,	acknowledge,	and	
attribute	declining	student	enrolment	patterns	in	their	low-ranked	schools	to	the	impact	
the	Fraser	institute	ranking	has	on	parental	choice-making	(McMartin,	2010).	At	issue	
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was	the	perception	that	higher-ranked	schools	are	overall	‘better’	schools	and	parents	
want	 their	 children	 attending	 them.	 School	 rankings,	 however,	 do	 not	 account	 for	
conditions	that	exist	for	students	outside	the	classroom	that	positively	(and	negatively)	
impact individual student performance and achievement patterns. This essential 
point has been raised repeatedly by a chorus of agents that are personally invested in 
developing a quality educational experience for different kinds of students attending 
different	kinds	of	schools	at	every	grade.	But	with	the	alignment	of	state-sanctioned	
educational	policy	reforms	that	paralleled	the	Fraser	institute’s	long-standing	position	
that	parental	choice	and	market-based	reform	initiatives	work	best	to	improve	schools,	
the perceived relevance of published school rankings to parents increased. Although 
many	British	Columbian	parents	looked	to	the	report	to	see	how	their	neighbourhood	
school	compared	to	others	when	it	was	first	published	in	the	spring	of	1998,	by	2003	
they	were	in	a	position	to	act	on	whatever	conclusions	they	gleaned	from	the	Fraser	
institute’s	school	report	card.
CONCLUSION
We	see	in	the	Fraser	institute’s	strategy	to	avail	itself	of	Ministry-acquired	data	the	
exercise	 of	 disciplinary	 power.	We	 have	 shown	 that	 a	 ranking	 instrument	 that	 is	
promoted	by	the	Fraser	institute	as	being	objective	does	not	serve	all	schools	in	the	same	
way.	At	issue	is	the	collision	of	two	competing	epistemic	approaches	about	how	best	to	
determine	an	overall	‘good’	school:	one	anchored	in	a	particular	kind	of	instrumental	
rationality,	whereby	schools	(and	the	students	attending	them)	are	reduced	to	a	set	of	
measurable	KPis;	the	other	anchored	in	a	belief	that	schools	are	complex	organizations	
that provide opportunities that serve the diverse educational needs of all students—an 
understanding	that	 transcends	measurement	on	KPis.	What’s	at	stake	is	 the	erosion	
of school cultures that value and serve different kinds of students in different kinds 
of	ways.	The	success	of	the	Fraser	institute	to	promote	the	former	approach	cannot	
be	overstated.	The	only	place	where	over	200	different	kinds	of	public	and	private/
independent secondary schools could possibly co-exist at the same time on the broader 
field	of	judgment	is	in	the	‘non-place’ of language and discourse. In devising a school-
ranking rubric that made possible the annual comparison of schools on the pages of 
provincial	newspapers,	the	Fraser	institute	effectively	created	a	marketplace	for	school	
choice	where	there	had	not	been	one	previously.	This	achievement	occurred	gradually	
over	time	and	was	made	possible	(in	part)	because	the	Fraser	institute	used	language	
in	strategic	and	deliberate	ways	to	mediate	relationships	of	power.	The	Fraser	institute	
understood that if the general public could not interpret published school rankings from 
the beginning then the general public could not make judgments about schools from 
the	beginning.	By	assigning	scores	to	schools	the	Fraser	institute	provided	readers	not	
only	with	an	index,	but	as	importantly	with	a	method	by	which	school	comparisons	
could be easily made. Reducing complex social institutions to a single measure in 
this	way	had	a	tremendous	impact	on	how	parents	not	only	viewed	public	and	private	
schools,	but	how	they	talked	about	them.
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We	have	characterized	the	kinds	of	discourses	generated	by	the	first	ranking	iteration	
as knowledge discourses—parents	were	 learning	about	 the	Fraser	 institute’s	 school	
report	card,	and	educators	were	 learning	how	 their	professional	practice	was	being	
impacted	as	a	result.	Knowledge	discourses	were	political	at	their	core	because	they	
served to manufacture a crisis about the state of secondary schools in British Columbia. 
Embedded	within	each	school	ranking	score	was	a	narrative	that	told	the	story	of	a	
school’s	relative	success	or	failure	according	to	KPis	imposed	on	the	general	public	
by	the	Fraser	institute.	Through	media	depictions	that	consistently	portrayed	private/
independent	schools	as	being	‘top’	ranked	schools,	a	reality	effect	was	created	in	the	
public’s	mind	over	time	that	private/independent	schools	were	better	than	their	public	
school	counterparts.	This	impression	was	formed	against	a	backdrop	of	discord	from	
parents,	teachers,	and	school	administrators	that	objected	to	the	way	public	schools	
were	characterized	and	stood	in	marked	contrast	to	how	the	Fraser	institute	focused	
the	 public’s	 attention	 on	what	mattered	 to	 the	 Fraser	 institute—the	 important	 role	
school	 choice	 initiatives	 could	play	 in	 improving	British	Columbia’s	 high	 schools.	
it	also	focused	the	public’s	gaze	on	low-ranked	schools,	most	of	which	were	public	
schools. The synoptic surveillance mechanisms made possible by differentiated KPIs 
embedded	within	school	ranking	rubrics	made	visible	and	concealed	entire	populations	
of students. When the kinds of stories that are told about schools become narrated 
through	school	ranking	reports	they	negate	capital	disparities	that	exist	between	schools	
and the populations they serve. At stake in storytelling of this kind is the emancipatory 
belief that different kinds of schools operate to serve the diverse educational needs of 
secondary	students	in	different	kinds	of	ways.
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